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Disclosure of Future-Oriented Information
Under the Securities Laws
A central goal of the Securities Act of 19331 and the Securities Ex-
change Act of 19342 is to provide a fair and efficient market for in-
vestment securities.3 Accordingly, the Acts pursue a policy of full dis-
closure of material information to investors. 4 Thus, business enter-
prises subject to the Acts must include prescribed information in
periodic reports filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC)5 and in reports sent directly to shareholders. 6
Nevertheless, there is substantial evidence that the disclosures now
required by the SEC are not fulfilling the purposes of the Acts: in-
vestors are unable to make realistic choices based on available informa-
tion, while insiders continue to enjoy significant advantages.1 This
Note argues that a major reason for this failure is that information dis-
closed in corporate filings is an inadequate and unreliable basis for
investment decisions. To implement the goals of securities regulation,
the SEC should require formal disclosure of financial forecasts by
management.
1. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1976).
2. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (1976).
3. 15 U.S.C. § 78b (1976) (aim of regulation is to "insure the maintenance of fair and
honest markets"). Regulation of securities markets is designed both to protect investors
and the broader public interest. Friend, The SEC and the Economic Performance of
Securities Markets, in ECONOMIC POLICY AND THE REGULATION OF CORPORATE SECURITIES
186 (H. Manne ed. 1969). Congress intended to protect investors from the abuses as-
sociated with securities markets, see Tracey & MacChesney, The Securities Exchange Act
of 1934, 32 MICH. L. Rv. 1025 (1934) (1934 Act designed to correct evils of market), and
to ensure the efficiency of those markets by allocating capital to the most efficient users,
see Friend, supra, at 190 ("[A]llocational efficiency has been regarded as the most im-
portant economic function performed by the securities markets .... ")
4. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77g, 78b (1976). The securities laws seek to compel disclosure of
material information to investors so that they can "evaluate the securities of . . . com-
panies on an informed and realistic basis." 38 SEC ANN. REP. 23 (1972). Information is
"material" when "a reasonable investor might [consider the information] important" in
making an investment decision. Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128,
153-54 (1972).
5. 15 U.S.C. § 78m (1976); see id. § 781(g) (enterprises with more than $1,000,000 in
assets and more than 500 shareholders must report).
6. Id. §§ 77a-77aa (registration of securities offerings); id. § 78n(a) (proxy rules); id.
§ 78n(d) (tender offers).
7. See pp. 343-45 infra.
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Future-oriented information that includes detailed cash flows," un-
like current SEC-mandated disclosures, would provide investors with
information that is relevant, reliable, and susceptible to meaningful
comparison. Because financial forecasts comport with the broad pur-
poses of disclosure regulation, and because objections to such forecasts
are no longer valid, a carefully conceived mandatory disclosure policy
should be implemented by the SEC.9 This Note suggests guidelines for
such a policy.
I. Financial Forecasts and the Goals of Disclosure
Disclosure of financial forecasts should be required only if the in-
formation so provided serves the goals of SEC disclosure regulation.
Analysis of the content of such disclosures indicates that they further
relevant goals by providing the basis for an informed investment
decision.
A. The Goals of Disclosure
One goal of Congress in mandating full disclosure of material in-
formation to investors was to promote optimal allocation of capital by
providing an efficient market for securities transactions.' 0 Capital
8. Cash flow statements summarize entries made in the company's cash accounts and
are valuable because they are unaffected by accounting methods. See M. GORDON & G.
SHILLINGLAw, ACCOUNTING: A MANAGEMENT APPROACH 84-87 (5th ed. 1974).
9. The SEC is authorized to prescribe rules and regulations to protect investors and to
ensure fair dealing in securities. See 15 U.S.C. § 78m(a) (1976).
Reliance on the securities market to ensure access to information is problematic because
information does not constitute a private good that can be sold in the marketplace. Ex-
clusive access by the "purchaser," therefore, cannot be guaranteed by the "seller." Gonedes
& Dopuch, Capital Market Equilibrium, Information Production, and Selecting Account-
ing Techniques: Theoretical Framework and Review of Empirical Work, in J. ACCOUNT-
ING RESEARCH 48, 65 (Supp. 1974).
In the absence of the disclosure requirements imposed by federal law, investors would
be seriously handicapped in securing information that is sufficient, reliable, and timely.
REPORT OF THE ADvIsORY COMMITTEE ON CORPORATE DISCLOSURE TO THE SECURITIES AND
EXCHANGE COMMISSION XVIII-XXXI (1977) [hereinafter cited as ADVISORY COMMITTEE
REPORT]; see Ronen, The Effect of Insider Trading Rules on Information Generation
and Disclosure by Corporations, 52 ACCOUNTING REv. 438 (1977) (market forces are in-
sufficient to compel adequate disclosure).
10. Capital is allocated equitably and efficiently when savings are channelled to the
most promising investment opportunity. See J. VAN HORNE, FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT AND
POLICY 8 (3d ed. 1974) (firm will attract capital only when its investment opportunities
justify use of that capital). An "efficient market" is generally understood to mean a
market "in which prices always fully reflect available information." Note, The Efficient
Capital Market Hypothesis, Economic Theory and the Regulation of the Securities In-
dustry, 29 STAN. L. REv. 1031, 1031 (1977). In a perfectly efficient market, the market
price of a security will always equal its investment value and the price will always be
"fair." Id. at 1069. Capital market efficiency cannot be addressed without attention to the
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markets operate most efficiently when investors have equal access to
widely disseminated financial information." When reliable informa-
tion is limited, the cost of capital rises because firms must pay a
"signalling premium"' 2 in order to encourage investors to supply
funds. When information is not accessible to investors on an equal
basis, the cost of capital rises because firms must pay an "unfairness
premium"' 3 in order to compensate for uncertainty.'" Thus, when the
market is operating efficiently, the firm will communicate informa-
tion regarding its true or "intrinsic" value15 to investors and the cost
of capital will approach the fair and equitable ideal.
A second goal of disclosure is to ensure fairness to the average in-
vestor, the investor who is not knowledgeable about the securities
market and who does not deal in securities or market information as
a professional. 16 Disclosure protects the investor by ensuring that
quality and quantity of available information. ADvIsoRY COMMrrEE REPORT, supra note
9, at XXXIII-XXXIV.
Markets that allocate capital through investment decisions have a profound influence
on the stability and growth of the national economy. R. WEST & S. TINIC, THE ECONoMI(.Ls
OF THE STOCK MARKET 4-6 (1971); FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BOARD, CONCEPTUAL
FRAMEWORK FOR FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING AND REPORTING: ELEMENTS OF FINANCIAL STATE-
MENTS AND THEIR MEASUREMENT 3-4 (1976) [hereinafter cited as FASB CONCEPTUAL FRAME-
WORK]. In enacting the securities laws, Congress was primarily concerned with remedying
the "misdirection" of capital resources. H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 2-3 (1933).
This Note addresses the efficiency of capital markets by considering both information
quality and quantity.
11. See Tracey & MacChesney, supra note 3, at 1026 ("[t]he best market is always the
broadest market, the one where the greatest number of buyers and sellers are assembled");
cf. Ronen, The Need for Accounting Objectives in an Efficient Market, in 2 OBJECTIVES
OF FINANCIAL STATEMENTS 36, 42 (J. Cramer & G. Sorter eds. 1974) (when number of
participants in marketplace is great, process is efficient).
12. Firms must "signal" investors by offering a premium on returns when the in-
formation system does not permit firms to reach a broad range of investors with news of
the firm's potential. Some firms regularly attract and hold the interest of anal)sts and
institutional investors, while other firms are less favored and must attract investors by
more aggressive means. Thus informal disclosure of future-oriented information may be
more expensive for some firms than it is for others-i.e., those that are regularly followed
by market professionals. See p. 353 infra.
13. Investors demand an "unfairness premium" when they lose confidence in securities
markets because insiders, analysts, and institutional investors use otherwise nonpublic
information to their own advantage. Investors may also demand an unfairness premium
when managements disclose positive information more freely than negative information.
14. See FASB CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK, supra note 10, at 4 ("[S]kepticism creates
artificial uncertainty-the appearance of greater riskiness-which has a cost: Investors...
demand a higher price to compensate for the perceived higher risk.")
15. See B. GRAHAM & P. DODD, SECURITY ANALYSIS 17 (1934) (firm's intrinsic value is
"that value which is justified by the facts").
16. See 1 SEC ANN. REP. 27 (1935) (securities laws intended "to place adequate and
true information before the investor"); V. BRUDNEY & M. CHIRELSTEIN, CORPORATE FINANCE
716-17 (1972) (disclosure intended to protect investors by equalizing access to relevant
information of small investor and market professional or corporate insider).
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securities are purchased at a fair price:' 7 the market price of a security
will approach its true value only when the market is operating ef-
ficiently to reflect reliable information. Full disclosure also provides
the investor access to a broad range of investment opportunities and
permits informed decisions that are most suited to the individual's in-
vestment objectives.
B. Information Needed by Investors
In order to make a realistic, informed investment decision, investors
need information about the future of the firm. Investors are in-
terested in increasing their wealth; they may look principally to the
prospect of receiving cash now (dividend income) or in the future (ap-
preciation, liquidation).' 8 Their investment decisions, therefore, are
based primarily on the firm's future sources of cash, the amounts of
cash anticipated by the firm, and the timing of cash transactions. Such
information bears directly upon the firm's ability to pay dividends and
hence upon the market price of the firm's securities. Historical in-
formation is relevant to these inquiries only insofar as it provides in-
sight about the future:' 9 future sales, costs, and management per-
tormance.20
17. Although the SEC has stressed its role as the "protector" of investors, see Anderson,
The Disclosure Process in Federal Securities Regulation: A Brief Review, 25 HASTINGS L.J.
311, 315 (1974) (SEC policies result in overprotection of small investor), it is clear that
the securities laws were intended to stabilize the securities markets by providing informa-
tion to market professionals and thus indirectly protect less sophisticated investors.
See Douglas & Bates, The Federal Securities Act of 1933, 43 YALE L.J. 171, 172 (1933)
(effect of 1933 Act was, inter alia, to place in market "a body of facts which, operating
indirectly through investment services and expert investors, [tends] to produce more
accurate appraisal of the worth of the security").
18. See FASB CONCEPTUAL FaXMEWORK, supra note 10, at 26 ("investors . . . are
basically interested in cash inflows to themselves"). Cash may be realized from income
(dividends) or appreciation (cash received upon sale of the security, based upon another
investor's expectation of income and appreciation), or both. Id. Whether the investor
seeks normal returns or superior (speculative) returns depends upon his preference for
risk and liquidity. See Tobin, Liquidity Preference as Behavior Towards Risk, 6 REv.
EcON. STUD. 65 (1958). Indeed, most investors "speculate" to some degree by purchasing
securities that they perceive to be undervalued by the market. See note 22 infra. In any
event, investors are interested in the "cash consequences of their economic decisions."
AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS, REPORT OF THE STUDY GROUP ON
THE OBJECTIVES OF FINANCIAL STATEMENTS, OBJECTIVES OF FINANCIAL STATEMENTS 13 (1973)
[hereinafter cited as AICPA STUDY GROUP].
19. FINANCIAL ANALYSTS FEDERATION, DISCLOSURE OF CORPORATE FORECASTS TO THE IN-
vWsroR 90 (1973) [hereinafter cited as FAF STUDY]; see Kripke, A Search for a Meaningful
Securities Disclosure Policy, 31 Bus. LAw. 293, 298 (1975) (figures about the past "are
totally irrelevant to a current or prospective investor").
20. See D. BELEMORE & J. RITCHIE, INVESTMENTS 324-26 (4th ed. 1974) (professional
analysts project sales by studying industry trends, volume, competition, and pricing
practices; they then project major items of expense, both recurring and nonrecurring,
including taxes).
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Future-oriented information, however, permits the investor to de-
termine a security's "investment value"2 ' and to compare it with
current market price. This comparison may confirm the expectations
of others who anticipate normal returns, or it may reveal that the
market has undervalued (or overvalued) the security so that superior
returns are available.
22
Investment decisions are not made solely by considering a single
security in isolation. 23 The investor also requires future-oriented in-
formation pertaining to other securities in order to make a meaning-
ful comparison.2 4 The investor considers the return and risk char-
acteristics of a set of securities and chooses the combination that
satisfies his overall investment objectives.2 5 Comparability across a wide
21. The investment value of the firm must be distinguished from the market price of
the security. The investment value of the firm is defined as its intrinsic value, see B.
GRAHAM & D. DODD, supra note 15, at 17, or the "present value of a stream of cash to the
investor, discounted at a rate that reflects the risk of the investment." Hagaman &
Jensen, Investment Value and Security Analysis, FINANCIAL ANALYSrS J., Mar.-Apr. 1977,
at 64; Cf. J. WILLIAMS, THE THEORY OF INVESTMENT VALUE 55 (1938) ("Let us define the
investment value of a stock as the present worth of all the dividends to be paid upon
it.") Investment values are relatively fixed and change "only in response to changes in
the company's fortunes or in investors' requirements for a level of return" whereas the
market price of a stock responds to the volatility of the trading market. Hagaman &
Jensen, supra, at 64.
22. A substantial body of financial theory asserts that there is no ptemium or superior
return available for "nonsystematic" risks-those risks that are firm-specific, because they
are not associated with general market movement. See J. LORIE & M. HAMILTON, THE
STOCK MARKET: THEORIES AND EVIDENCE 70-124 (1973). But others argue that investors can
expect rewards for the assumption of nonsystematic risks. See J. FRANCIS & S. ARCHER,
PORTFOLIO ANALYSIS 175-80, 182-94 (1971) (rationality of investing in undervalued securities
to achieve superior returns); Bines, Modern Portfolio Theory and Investment Manage-
ment Law: Refinement of Legal Doctrine, 76 COLUm. L. REv. 721, 761-63 (1976) (accepting
unsystematic risk to achieve superior returns is rational investment objective). Moreover,
the investment community behaves as if undervaluation can be detected. See ADVISORY
COMMIrEE REPORT, supra note 9, at 36-93 (security analysts search for information that
is firm-specific).
23. The rational investor not only seeks the individual security with the highest return
relative to associated risk, but also seeks the most promising combination of securities for
his portfolio. See Kripke, An Opportunity for Fundamental Thinking-The SEC's Ad-
visory Committee on Corporate Disclosure, in SEC '77, at 80 (S. Glasser ed. 1977) ("It is
thus a wholly impracticable goal to think that a securities decision can be made in-
telligently from disclosure documents relating to a single company.") (emphasis in
original).
24. Measuring and comparing the expected performance of securities of companies
within a given industry is an important analytic tool for investment decisions. ADVISORY
COMMITrEE REPoRT, supra note 9, at 50. Evaluation of corporate performance requires
"analysis of each segment" of the industry as well as the "relationship of those segments
to the whole," id. at D-20, and standardization of industry reporting will, therefore,
benefit investors. Id. at D-19.
25. Investors expect to be compensated with higher returns if they assume greater
risks and will choose only those investment opportunities that offer the highest return
for any level of risk. H. MARKOWITZ, PORTFOLIO SELECTION: EFFICIENT DIVERSIFICATION OF
INVESTMENTS 5-7 (1959).
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range of investment opportunities, therefore, is necessary to ensure an
optimal investment decision.
The investor also requires information concerning the reliability of
his investment decision-the potential impact of future events on the
security's value.26 Comparing the performance of an individual security
with the performance of the market for all securities is one way to test
the reliability of the investment value. 27 By considering a security's
volatility-its tendency to move with general stock prices-the investor
can assess the impact of exogenous events on the security's return. In
assessing reliability, the investor also examines firm-specific factors,28
such as management's expected response to future events. Thus de-
tailed financial information, including management's plans for invest-
ments, financing, and dividends, is highly relevant to the investor's
assessment of the reliability of his decision.
2 9
Future-oriented information is essential because it permits the in-
vestor to anticipate management's response to future events, and to
correct his investment choices accordingly. Thus it is the extent to
which the projection is adaptable to subsequent events that measures
its trustworthiness rather than the accuracy of a specific numerical
projection.
II. The Inadequacy of Present Disclosure Regulations
The SEC's present disclosure policy assumes that an investor's need
for future-oriented information can be met by a record of manage-
26. Cf. Libby & Rollinson, Securities Law of Materiality as it May Relate to "Op-
tional" Publication of Projections, 31 Bus. LAw. 701, 703 (1976) (forecasts "may be revised
dramatically and frequently"). Revisions are often appropriate regardless of whether new
information is firm-specific or more general: a ban on aspirin will have an impact on a.
pharmaceutical company's sales and cash flow; a rise it! interest rates will influence the
growth of a capital-intensive firm planning new offerings.
27. Comparison of individual securities in order to achieve the benefits of diversifica-
tion can be complex. See J. LORIE & M. HAMILTON, suPra note 22, at 198 (comparing 1,000
securities required 501,500 statistical inputs). But "since almost all securities are signif-
icantly correlated with the market as a whole," the performance of a single security can
be compared with the performance of the securities market in general. Id. at 199.
28.- The investor assesses both growth and risk by forecasting systematic changes that
may affect the reliability of the value of the security, that is, the risk of the risk. See
Fouse, Risk and Liquidity Revisited, FINANCIAL ANALYSTS J., Jan.-Feb. 1977, at 41 (break-
ing down discount factor implicitly used by market and analyzing its components
permits assessment of forecast's sensitivity to changes in general interest levels and firm-
specific events).
29. The detail in financial reports should be sufficient to permit backward-looking
"[c]omparison of evolving [plans that] are perhaps the most useful tool for management
appraisal by outside investors." Libby & Rollinson, supra note 26, at 703.
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ment's past performance 30-historic earnings.31 Recent studies, how-
ever, offer evidence that securities markets may not be functioning
efficiently under this "surrogate" theory.32 Moreover, financial analysts
and professional investors are relying less on information available in
formal reports, such as earnings statements, and are seeking future-
30. See Kripke, supra note 19, at 294 (SEC relies on two unarticulated assumptions:
(i) "the past foretells the future reasonably well" and historical information "will be a
reasonable basis for prediction of the future;" and (ii) "the standard accounting model,
based on reporting the past on a historical cost basis, reasonably corresponds with
reality").
31. In the early days of federal regulation of securities markets, this assumption may
have been more valid than it is today. It was apparently a "common precept" in the
decade following enactment of the securities laws to substitute earnings for dividends in
valuation models. See J. WILLIAMS, supra note 21, at 57-58 (dividends, not earnings, de-
termine value); Hawkins, Toward an Old Theory of Equity Valuation, FINANCIAL ANA-
LYSTS J., Nov.-Dec. 1977, at 48, 49 ("[i]nvestors have focused on earnings per share
growth, rather than dividend growth, despite the fact that [traditional valuation] models
focus on dividends"). Since flexible accounting principles permitted managements to
"smooth" earnings so that they paralleled cash flows to the investor, see Ronen, Sadan
& Snow, Income Smoothing: A Review, I ACCOUNTING J. 11, 12 (1977) (income smoothing
is "dampening of fluctuations about some level of earnings that is currently considered
to be normal for the firm"), past earnings offered an effective substitute for information
about future dividends. See Kripke, supra note 19. at 294.
Smoothing income permits management to reduce the variability of earnings that
might be interpreted negatively by investors, thus reducing the tendency to discount the
value of the firm's shares. Managements may also smooth income to reduce the stock's
systematic risk-that is, its covariance with market returns. Ronen, Sadan & Snow, supra,
at 12. For a description of how smoothing is accomplished, see id. at 13.
32. Studies indicate that insiders consistently out-perform the market. See Finnerty,
Insiders and Market Efficiency, 31 J. FINANCE 1141, 1148 (1976) ("Insiders can and do
identify profitable as well as unprofitable situations within their corporations."); Jaffe,
The Effect of Regulation Changes on Insider Trading, 5 BELL J. ECON. & MANAGEIENT
Sc. 93, 101-15 (1974); Pratt & DeVere, Relationship Between Insider Trading and Rates
of Return for NYSE Common Stocks, 1960-1966, in MODERN DEVELOPMENTS IN INVESTMENT
MANAGEMENT 268-79 (J. Lorie & R. Brealey eds. 1972). Moreover, there is evidence that
some investors have attained superior results. See Basu, Investment Performance of
Common Stocks in Relation to their Price-Earnings Ratios: A Test of the Efficient Market
Hypothesis, 32 J. FINANCE 663 (1977) (portfolios consisting of carefully selected securities
achieve significantly higher returns than randomly selected securities); Beebower &
Bergstrom, A Performance Analysis of Pension and Profit-Sharing Portfolios: 1966-1975,
FINANCIAL ANALYSTS J., May-June 1977, at 31 (managers with superior performances in
one period continued to perform better in second period). Although market efficiency
demands that a relatively large number of operators act on accurate information so that
the market can produce accurate results, Ronen, supra note 11, at 42, studies indicate
that there is both periodic and systematic inefficiency in the dissemination of information,
see Garbade & Wiesen, The Materiality of Inside Information: An Application of Capital
Market Analysis, in SALOMON BROTHERS CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
WORKING PAPER No. 74 (1976) (time lags can be several trading days); Zeikel, The Random
Walk and Murphy's Law, I J. PORTFOLIO MANAGEMENT 20 (1974) (time lags follow release
of new information). Indeed some studies question whether management control of non-
public information is socially desirable. See May & Sundem, Cost of Information and
Security Prices: Market Association Tests for Accounting Policy Decisions, 48 ACCOUNTING




oriented information directly from managements.3 3 The assumption
that past values and trends are a reasonable guide to future values and
trends is no longer valid,34 for inflation renders historic values less
indicative of future values, 33 and the complexity and sophistication of
corporate affairs have made such comparisons problematic.3 6 The SEC
has recognized these problems and has attempted to reform historic
repoiting through supplementary disclosures, such as statements of "re-
placement costs" of assets37 and "changes in financial position." 38 In
addition, the SEC now permits disclosure of single-figure earnings
forecasts. 3 9 Yet none of these reforms assures investors of access to
reliable future-oriented information necessary for realistic investment
decisionmaking.
33. ADVISORY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 9, at 55. ("[M]anagements' own projections
of the company's performance [are] considered by analysts as being vital information in
the first instance rather than simply confirmatory of the analysts' projection.")
34. See Kripke, The SEC, the Accountants, Some Myths and Some Realities, 45 N.Y.U.
L. REv. 1151, 1188-89 (1970) ("At the time [the SEC's views] were established, they were
reasonable . . . . Unfortunately, however, the views continue to the present day when
they no longer seem reasonable.')
35. See Charles, Inflation Accounting, 9 REv. SEC. REO. 951, 952 (1976).
36. See De Lancey, A.P.B. Opinion No. 15 (Earnings Per Share) from a Lawyer's Stand-
point, 25 Bus. LAW. 419, 434 (1970) (primary earnings per share may be incomprehensible
to all but a few); Kripke, supra note 34, 4t 1167 ("[M]odem accounting has become in-
creasingly complex."); ci. Mims, Pressuring the FASB to Broaden Its Reach, Bus. WVEEK,
Nov. 28, 1977, at 96 (preparers and users complain that today's financial statements are
weighted down with complex and confusing footnotes that are becoming increasingly
incomprehensible); The Global Snares for Corporate Accountants, Bus. WVEEK, July 25,
1977, at 162 (two companies with identical sales and costs show profits 100% apart by
employing alternative but acceptable accounting practices). For examples of accepted
accounting devices used to present earnings in a favorable light, see Briloff, Dirty Pool-
ing, 42 AccouNTING REv. 489 (1967) ("dirty pooling"); Gunther, Part Purchase-Part Pool-
ing-The Infusion of Confusion into Fusion, 39 N.Y. CPA 241 (1969) (partial pooling).
37. Securities Act Release No. 5695, 17 C.F.R. § 210.3-17 (1977), reprinted in 5 FED. SMc.
L. REP. (CCH) 72,212 (certain registrants must disclose estimated current replacement
cost of inventories and productive capacity and approximate cost of sales and deprecia-
tion based on replacement cost for two most recent fiscal years).
38. The Accounting Principles Board (APB) issued a formal opinion in 1963 that
encouraged presentation of a statement of sources and uses of funds. APB Opinion No. 3,
reprinted in 2 APB AccoUNTING PRINCIPLES (CCH) 6511 (1963). In 1971, the APB issued
an opinion that required a statement summarizing the "changes in financial position" of
a business enterprise. APB Opinion No. 19, reprinted in id. at 6679. These pronounce-
ments are adopted as rules by the SEC. See Accounting Series Release No. 150 (Dec. 20,
1973), 5 FED. SEc. L REP. (CCH) 72,172.
39. See Securities Act Release No. 5362 (Feb. 2, 1973), [1972-1973] FED. SEc. L. REP.
(CCH) 79,211, at 82,667. Although the SEC did not explicitly adopt a specific rule
governing these disclosures, it suggested that a projection should "be expressed as an
exact figure or within a reasonable range." Id. Thus, the SEC does not suggest that projec-
tions include any underlying detail. See Securities Act Release No. 5699 (Apr. 23, 1976),
[1975-1976] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 80,461, at 86,200 (effect of amendment to proxy
rules, 14a-9, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9 (1977), is merely "to remove predictions of future earn-
ings from the list of examples as to what may be misleading in a proxy statement").
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A. Problems with Historic Reporting
Although historic cost accounting exudes "an aura of precision and
exactitude,"4° its flexible reporting rules result in a lack of uni-
formity4l that prevents intelligent comparison of financial reports.4 2
Because traditional reporting demands periodic accounting for events
that actually affect several reporting periods, the economic conse-
quences of past events must be predicted or estimated.4a In so doing,
enterprises may choose from alternative accounting principles; how-
ever, the alternative chosen is not always disclosed to investors. 44 Thus
the financial reports of various enterprises may reflect different com-
putational assumptions that make comparison difficult, if not im-
possible.4
5
In addition to impeding meaningful comparisons among securities,
historic cost accounting yields inaccurate information concerning as-
40. FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BOARD, SCOPE AND IMPLICATIONS OF THE CON-
CEPTUAL FRAMEWORK PROJECT 2 (1976).
41. See Heller, Disclosure Requirements Under Federal Securities Regulation, 16 Bus.
LAW. 300, 310 (1961) (reporting enterprises may select accounting alternatives in order to
influence earnings). Flexibility is permitted only to the extent that firms conform with
generally accepted accounting principles articulated by authoritative bodies. For a his-
tory of the accounting profession's development of such principles, see D. KIEso & J.
WEYGANDT, INTERMEDIATE ACCOUNTING 7-18 (1974).
42. But see AICPA STUDY GROUP, supra note 18, at 16 ("[C]omparabjlity should be the
overriding consideration for choosing among methods.")
43. COMMISSION ON AUDITORS' RESPONSIBILITIES, AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF CERTIFIED PUBLIC
ACCOUNTANTS, REPORT, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS 23 (1978) (report of com-
mission chaired by M. Cohen) (financial statement amounts must often be determined on
basis of best estimates that management can make at time) [hereinafter cited as COHEN
COMMISSION].
This process of estimation is usually implemented through use of accrual accounting
which recognizes the financial effects of transactions and other events when they occur
rather than when cash is received or paid.
44. See The Global Snares for Corporate Accountants, Bus. WEEK, July 25, 1977, at
162 ("[T]he choice of a particular accounting treatment can drastically reduce or boost
reported profits. But the problem is that a company may not spell out in its financial
statements which methods it uses.") For example, net income may vary according to the
predicted life chosen for a given asset. A firm that purchases an asset for $1,000 can,
hypothetically, depreciate that asset over a useful life of 10, 20, or 50 years. Using straight-
line depreciation, yearly charges equal the cost of the asset divided by the useful life.
Thus, if the asset produces $100 of gross income each year, the reported net income
(gross income less yearly depreciation) can equal $0, $50, or $80, depending on the useful
life selected. Accountants are thus permitted to smooth income by changing the predicted
lives of assets without disclosure. See D. Kimso & J. WEYGANDT, supra note 41, at 490
(accepted accounting methods require no entry when change in estimate occurs).
45. Whether differences in accounting principles can be adjusted by market profes-
sionals to a form that permits comparability (given that computational assumptions are
disclosed) is less important than whether adjustments can be made efficiently, so that
the market price will reflect the security's intrinsic value within a reasonable period of
time. Studies show that periodic inefficiencies do exist. See Brown, Earnings Changes,
Stock Prices, and Market Efficiency, 33 J. FINANCE 17 (1978) (adjustment takes ap-
proximately 45 days); cf. Kaplan & Roll, Investor Evaluation of Accounting Information:
Some Empirical Evidence, 45 J. Bus. 225 (1972) (changes in accounting techniques af-
fected stock prices for no more than one quarter after disclosure).
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set values. The values of assets are recorded at their original costs and
are systematically reduced by depreciation charges over future periods.40
Because the market values of assets may appreciate at the same time
that accounting values are depreciating, the historical cost model
severely understates the value of assets. 47 Such inaccuracy impairs the
investor's ability to value the enterprise. Insiders may reap profits by
acquiring companies the assets of which are grossly undervalued.
4 8
B. Problems with Earnings Statements
Historic reporting has traditionally relied upon the earnings state-
ment as the primary method of advising investors of the firm's capacity
to generate cash. However, the earnings statement, both because it is
based on historic information and because it reports "income" 49 rather
than cash flow, does not adequately inform investors of the firm's
future cash-generating capacity. Such information is extremely im-
portant to investors.5 0
The concept of income embodied in the earnings statement suffers
from severe definitional problems.51 These problems, in addition to
the lack of uniformity in accounting methods,52 permit management
to manipulate earnings data.
5 3
46. In the example given, note 44 supra, the value of the $1000 asset depreciated over
a life of 50 years would decrease in this manner:
At Year = 1 5 10 20
Book Value - $980 $900 $800 $600
47. When inflation is 57 per year, for example, the cost to replace the asset could
increase in this manner:
At Year = 1 5 10 20
Replacement Cost = $1050 $1276 $1629 $3207
See Securities Act Release No. 5608 (Aug 27, 1975), [19
75 -197 6 ] Fm.. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
80,270 (SEC recognized that valuation of firm is difficult during periods of inflation
when historical cost accounting distorts values of assets).
48. See Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 298 F. Supp. 66 (E.D.N.Y. 1969), modified,
478 F.2d 1281 (2d Cir. 1973) (management failed to disclose information concerning un-
realized appreciation of assets); Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 99 F. Supp. 808 (D. Del. 1951)
(management failed to disclose information concerning unrealized appreciation of in-
ventories).
49. Income, although not yet clearly defined, is determined by matching costs against
revenues, and by making necessary allocations of cost to related reporting periods. But
commentators question whether "income" has economic meaning. See Treynor, The
Trouble with Earnings, FINANCIAL ANALYSTS J., Sept.-Oct. 1972, at 43.
50. See Sorter, Gans, Rosenfield, Shannon & Streit, Earning Power and Cash Gen-
erating Ability, in 2 OBJECTIVES OF FINANCIAL STATEMENTS, supra note 11, at 112 (enter-
prises that are successful at generating cash said to possess earning power).
51. But cf. Sorter, Accounting Income and Economic Income, in 2 OBJECTIVES OF
FINANCIAL STATEMENTS, supra note I1, at 108 (problem of definition is avoided by using
concept of cash flows).
52. See p. 346 sukra (earnings subject to discretionary estimates).
53. See Ronen, Sadan & Snow, supra note 31 (income smoothing). An additional ele-
ment of confusion is introduced when projections are used, because they are then com-
pared to statements of actual earnings, which themselves constitute predictions about
unrealized events.
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Moreover, earnings reported under the historical cost accounting
model do not accurately reflect the amount of cash available for future
distribution or reinvestment.5 4 Accounting values and depreciation
charges based on historical cost do not address the cost of asset replace-
ment during periods of inflation. 55 Companies have had to use earn-
ings from operations to replace exhausted assets in order to maintain
existing levels of operations, and have been unable to use such earn-
ings to finance new projects.56 Thus investors can no longer assume
that reinvested earnings will lead to dividends or dividend growth.
Earnings statements are currently less representative of actual cash
flows than they have been in the past, because income is now in-
fluenced by non-cash events57 such as changes in foreign exchange
rates,58 but is not adjusted to reflect near-cash events such as unrealized
losses on highly liquid assets such as marketable securities.59 In addi-
tion, earnings statements are an unreliable surrogate for cash-flow in-
formation because they do not disclose situations in which the capital
structure of the firm will not support the additional borrowing neces-
sary to continue dividends when cash generated from operations is
insufficient.6 0
Because historic earnings reports fail to disclose material informa-
tion affecting the firm's future cash flows, the investor cannot assess
54. Hawkins, supra note 31, at 50; see H. BIERMAN & S. SMIDT, THE CAPITAL BUDGETING
DECISION 108-44 (3d ed. 1971) ("The earnings figures resulting from current accounting
practices are not usable.")
55. See Hawkins, supra note 31, at 50 (as inflation rates increase, charges against in-
come understate capital required to replace productive assets and inventory).
56. Id. ("Companies had to use earnings to finance the status quo rather than to
finance growth.")
57. For instance, research and development expenditures must be set off against in-
come immediately, and are not allocated to years of expected benefits. FINANCIAL ACCOUNT-
ING STANDARDS BOARD, STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS No. 2: ACCOUNTING
FOR RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT COSTS (1974). As a result, income will be higher in future
periods when benefit from such expenditures is realized without further cash outflow.
58. See FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BOARD, STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING
STANDARDS No. 8: ACCOUNTING FOR THE TRANSLATION OF FOREIGN CURRENCY TRANSACTIONS
AND FOREIGN CURRENCY FINANCIAL STATEMENTS (1975).
59. See FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BOARD, STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL ACCOUNT-
ING STANDARDS No. 12: ACCOUNTING FOR CERTAIN MARKETABLE SECURITIES (1975). Because
managements are denied flexibility in reporting near-cash and non-cash events, they can
no longer smooth earnings in order to parallel cash flows to the investor. Cf. FINANCIAL
ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BOARD, STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS No. 5:
ACCOUNTING FOR CONTINGENCIES (1975) (limiting management discretion in treatment of
reserves). The FASB takes the position that minimizing fluctuations in performance is
the function of financial analysis and not the function of financial reporting. See
FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BOARD, ROUNDTABLE DISCUSSION ON THE CONCEPTUAL
FRAMEWORK PROJECT 2 (1977) (accounting profession should not minimize reporting of
fluctuations because investors will not be confused).
60. Hawkins, supra note 31, at 49-50; see Cobbs, The Tax that is Killing Investment,
Bus. WEEK, Jan. 16, 1978, at 16 ("The ratio of debt to equity in many industries is
close to the danger point.")
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the reliability of his investment decision."1 Without an objective stan-
dard for measuring management's past performance, the investor cannot
predict management's ability to respond to future developments.0 2
The SEC has attempted to remove distortions in historic reports
due to inflation by requiring larger firms to restate the value of their
assets in terms of current replacement costs. 03 Current earnings are
then restated using more realistic depreciation charges. Replacement
cost earnings are unhelpful, however, both because estimates of replace-
ment costs are highly subjective and because they do not apply to all
assets and liabilities affected by inflation. More importantly, state-
ments of replacement cost earnings do not inform the investor if or
wizen cash may be required in order to replace assets. 65
C. Problems with Cash Flow Statements
Although the deficiencies of earnings statements are widely recog-
nized, it is frequently argued that market professionals can compensate
effectively by simply deriving cash flow statements from the informa-
tion already disclosed. Indeed, cash flow information can be extremely
valuable to the investor.
Proper interpretation of cash flow data facilitates an assessment of a
firm's dividend policy and long-term growth or liquidation potential.
Cash flow projections also promote the reliability of future-oriented
information. Because cash forecast data is stated in current dollars
relating to the current business cycle, the financial information is only
minimally distorted by inflation. Moreover, the investor values in-
formation about cash flows because cash is unaffected by the choice of
61. Mims, Pressuring the FASB to Broaden Its Reach, Bus. WVEEK, Nov. 28, 1977, at
96 (quoting SEC Chairman Harold Williams). Many corporate managers are rewarded
for producing illusory profits and are "running an operation which, in real terms, is
dissipating its capital." Id.
62. See Libby & Rollinson, supra note 26, at 703 (without adequate future-oriented
information investor is unable to assess quality of management's plans and performance).
63. Securities Act Release No. 5695, 17 C.F.R. § 210.3-.17 (1977), reprinted in 5 FED.
SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 72,212.
64. See Chambers, The Delusions of Rep~lacement Cost Accounting, FINANCIAL
ANALYSTS J., July-Aug. 1977, at 51 ("Whatever else may be said about it, distributable
income [under replacement cost accounting] is hypothetical. . . .") Moreover, not all
assets affected by inflation are included in replacement cost statements. See id. at 52
(replacement cost "deals only with changes in the costs of tangible, non-monetary assets").
For example, replacement cost accounting ignores both the current market price of debt
and current interest rates. See Largay & Livingstone, Current Value Accounting Neglects
Liabilities, FINANCIAL ANALYSTs J., Mar.-Apr. 1978, at 65 (impact of inflation on liability
accounting is substantial). There is, therefore, an inability to make meaningful com-
parisons, even among companies within the same industry.
65. See Chambers, supra note 64, at 49, 51 (replacement cost earnings do not reflect
cash).
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accounting methods; 66 cash therefore represents objective information
not subject to manipulation by management.
Nevertheless, cash flow statements, without more, can be insufficient
and potentially misleading.6 7 For example, a firm with cash avail-
able for current dividends may, in fact, be liquidating; a firm ex-
periencing a "cash crunch" may be sacrificing current dividends in
favor of future growth. Indeed, the concept of income was devel-
oped in order to represent cash flows more accurately over time68-to
permit an accounting for events such as capital expenditures that bene-
fit future periods.69 Managements that include cash flow figures in
annual reports, particularly when "cash flow per share" is stressed, are
criticized when such information is unsupported by the firm's actual
sources and uses of cash.
70
To satisfy the investors' need for information about cash while at
the same time limiting the potential for management abuse of such
data, the SEC now requires a statement of the firm's "changes in
financial position," commonly called a statement of "working cap-
ital." 1 The information provided permits use of the balance sheet,
income statement, and the working capital statement in order to derive
cash flows.
Although the working capital statement eliminates the potential for
misleading the investor through undue emphasis on "cash flow per
share" information and mediates the gap between basic financial state-
ments and the firm's actual sources and uses of cash, its own short-
comings have been heavily criticized.72 The working capital statement
is considered a rich man's tool, since it requires further operation by
66. Because cash is unaffected by accounting methods, R. Brief & J. Owen, Cash
Flows, Accounting Data and Performance Measures (Mar. 3, 1978) (unpublished paper
presented to New York University Accounting Workshop) (on file with Yale Law
Journal), it is not subject to definitional problems. See Sorter, supra note 51, at 108
(problem of definition avoided by using concept of cash flow).
67. Cf. Mason, 'Cash Flow' Analysis and Funds Statement, in AICPA AccouNTING
REsEARCH STUDY No. 2 (1961) (encouraging sounder understanding of cash flow in light
of frequent misuse of cash flow figures).
68. Cf. Ronen, Sadan & Snow, supra note 31, at 12 (normalizing cash flows reduces
firm's risk).
69. See generally Watts & Zimmerman, The Demand For and Supply of Accounting
Theories: The Market for Excuses 36-38 (Jan. 1978) (unpublished Working Paper No.
GPB 77-7, Graduate School of Management, University of Rochester) (theories and origins
of "income").
70. See D. BELLEMORE & J. RITCHIE, supra note 20, at 179-80.
71. See note 38 supra. The working capital statement, also called the "sources and
uses of funds statement" or "funds statement," is permitted to take a number of forms,
and lack of uniformity in both terminology and form makes comparisons among com-
panies problematic.
72. See G. WVELSCH, C. ZLATKOVICH & J. WHITE, INTERMEDIATE AccouNTING 1013-15 (3d
ed. 1972).
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experts in order to derive cash flows. Hence, the working capital state-
ment magnifies inequalities among investors; the statement provides
access to cash flow information only to those investors who can afford
the cost of expert analysis. The problem is further magnified with
respect to financial forecasts because cash flows would have to be
derived from both the working capital statement and the balance sheet.
D. Problems with SEC Forecasting Policy
As the problems with historical cost accounting have become in-
creasingly apparent and the usefulness of historic reports as surrogates
for future. values and cash flows has become more doubtful, the SEC
has moved toward permitting direct disclosure of future-oriented in-
formation. The SEC has departed from its longstanding prohibition of
projections and currently permits voluntary disclosure of single-figure
earnings forecasts. 73 But this policy has failed to alleviate structural
market inefficiency and unfairness to investors, because the disclosure
scheme fails to mandate detailed projections that include cash flows.
The SEC's policy of voluntary disclosure of future-oriented informa-
tion has encouraged a "black market" of information in which firms
practice selective disclosure-disclosure to some but not all individ-
uals.7 4 Aggressive analysts and professional investors seek nonpublic,
future-oriented information directly from managements, 75 because it
helps them construct a superior forecast or confirm a current analysis.
The existence of this black market reduces the overall efficiency of
73. See note 39 supra. The SEC commenced a study of financial forecasting in 1972.
Exchange Act Release No. 9844 (Nov. 1, 1972), [1972-1973] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
79,075. After examining its position, the SEC acknowledged that financial forecasts
were widely relied upon and would not be considered misleading if "reasonably based in
fact, prepared with reasonable care and carefully reviewed." Exchange Act Release No.
9984 (Feb. 2, 1973), [1972-1973] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 79,211, at 82,668. "Information
gathered at the hearings reinforced the Commission's own observation that management's
assessment of a company's future performance is information of significant importance
to the investor ... and that such information should be available . . .on an equitable
basis to all investors." Id. at 82,667 (emphasis added). Although predictions of earnings
were at one time considered misleading by the SEC, earnings projections are now
permitted. Securities Act Release No. 5699 (Apr. 23, 1976), [1975-1976] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) " 80,461, at 86,202 (longstanding policy generally not to permit projections may
have served as impediment to disclosure of projections to investors); see Schneider,
Financial Projections, 7 REV. SEC. REG. 907 (1974) (SEC statement "signalled a reversal of
[its] historical position").
74. See ADVISORY COMMIrrEE REPORT, supra note 9, at XVIII (large numbers of pro-
fessionals constantly seek out information); Gray, Proposal for Systenatic Disclosure of
Corporate Forecasts, FINANCIAL ANALYSTS J., Jan.-Feb. 1973, at 65 (analysts regularly receive
nonpublic information from corporate managements). This practice is clearly illegal.
Issuers have a responsibility to disclose material facts, both favorable and unfavorable,
and to do so without selective disclosure to analysts. Securities Act Release No. 5699 (Apr.
23, 1976), [1975-1976] FED. SEC. L. RP. (CCH) 80,461, at 86,202-03.
75. See ADVISORY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 9, at 56.
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securities markets. The securities laws are premised on the existence of
a broad market made up of many investors. The underlying theory
suggests that concurrent investment analyses by sophisticated profes-
sionals result in accurate market prices.7 A small submarket made up
of investors with inside information, therefore, tends to distort the
accuracy of market prices.17
Moreover, the SEC's present policy of permitting, without requir-
ing, disclosure of financial forecasts is unfair to investors because it
permits managements to suppress and to control information flows.
Managements withhold adverse information in the hope that circum-
stances will improve and release positive information at times of
maximum impact.78 As a result, managements have substituted "in-
formation smoothing" for "income smoothing." 79 Investors cannot
rely on traditional safeguards afforded formal disclosure, such as
periodic reporting80 and independent reviews,81 to counteract this
form of manipulation. Thus, investor confidence in securities markets
is undermined.
The current SEC policy promotes further structural market in-
efficiency because voluntary disclosure of financial forecasts does not
76. See Ronen, supra note 11, at 42.
77. The SEC has expressed concern over the practice of selective disclosure. See
Securities Act Release No. 5699 (Apr. 23, 1976), [1975-1976] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
80,461, at 86,202-03 (warning issuers of their responsibility to make full and prompt
disclosure of material facts, both favorable and unfavorable). The practice is clearly
condemned by the securities laws, see 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1976) (antifraud provisions), and
by the courts, SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 848, 852 (2d Cir. 1968)
(securities laws violated when those who have access to material nonpublic information
divulge that information to "tippees").
78. Ronen, supra note ii, at 50-51. Release of positive information tends to be timed
shortly before new issues are offered even though the practice is illegal. Id.; see Lurie &
Pastena, How Promptly Do Corporations Disclose Their Problems? FINANCIAL ANALYSTS
J., Sept.-Oct. 1975, at 58 (empirical studies indicate that firms' disclosures of events that
adversely affect income are clustered toward end of fiscal year). Often management con-
ceals bad news hoping that it will be temporary, ADVIsORY COiMMiTTEE REPORT, supra
note 9, at XXVIII, but such concealment also serves management's self-interest in job
security, id.
79. See note 31 supra (income smoothing). Information smoothing, on the other hand,
is the conscious manipulation of information in order to present the firm's position in
the best possible light. See FAF STUDY, supra note 19, at 51 (quoting former SEC Chair-
man William J. Casey) ("present disclosure system operates to block the very information
in which the investor is most interested ...while simultaneously allowing ...private
forecasts which are unregulated"). Information smoothing is, of course, illegal. See note
74 supra.
80. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d) (1976) (firms must file periodic financial report with SEC).
Reports are also required for other events. See id. § 78n(a) (proxy solicitations); id. § 78n(d)
(tender offers).
81. Financial statements that accompany registration statements required by Schedule




permit broad comparison among firms. Under the SEC's voluntary
forecasting policy some, but not all, companies will report forecasts.
Because only one firm in ten whose securities are publicly traded is
re-ularly followed by one or more analysts, 2 it is doubtful that all
information will be efficiently reflected in market prices. Thus an in-
vestor's present opportunities to compare an individual security against
the market and against similar securities render a realistic and in-
formed investment decision unlikely.
III. Meeting Traditional Objections to Forecasting
Because' the SEC's disclosure policy is inadequate to meet the in-
formational needs of investors and to provide an efficient market for
securities transactions, and because future-oriented information serves
both these goals, the SEC should consider mandating disclosure of
earnings and cash flow forecasts. Indeed, the future-oriented informa-
tion essential to investors is now generated by management in the form
of internal projections.8 3 Moreover, traditional objections to such
forecasts do not pose a significant danger to a well-planned SEC policy
mandating projections.
A. Fear that Projections May Mislead Investors
One group of traditional objections to forecasts rests on the assertion
that forecasts will exacerbate market inefficiency because investors
will be confused by the disclosures or misled by management manipula-
tion of them. Such fears are unfounded, however, and cannot be con-
sidered a basis for opposition to a carefully drafted disclosure plan.
1. Investor Confusion
Some experts have opposed disclosure of management forecasts based
on fears that investors will tend to accept projections as statements of
determinate fact. 4 Such fears are misplaced, however, because both
82. ADVISoRY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 9, at XXII-1II.
83. See FAF STUDY, supra note 19, at 36 ("Most companies already have an ample
internal documentation for forecasting through formal budgets and other planning docu-
ments characteristic of well managed companies."); Kripke, supra note 34, at 1197
(corporations use projections as basis for decisions as' to borrowing, building new plants,
establishing new branches, ordering materials, hiring and training labor); Ruder, Dis-
closure of Financial Projections-Developments, Problems and Techniques, in PLI Flr
ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON SECURITIES RFGULATION 12 (1974) ("[T]here seems little doubt that
managements of most American businesses regularly produce forecasts for internal use.")
84. See Heller, supra note 41, at 307 (opinions stated by management accepted as fact
because they "suggest to the investor a competence and authority which in fact does not
exist").
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professional and less sophisticated investors seem to understand the
tentative nature of forecasts.85 Investors have had access to projections
under SEC rules since 1976, and available evidence indicates that the
predicted confusion has not materialized.86 Many disclosures mandated
under current SEC rules are based on informed predictions and judg-
ments concerning the consequences of past events.8 7 Moreover, esti-
mates of current values, such as the replacement costs of assets, are now
required for some reporting enterprises.
88
Any danger that the average investor will be misled by manage-
ment projections can be mitigated by clearly segregating forecast data
from historic reports in the firm's financial statements and by alerting
the investor to the tentative nature of projections. In addition, man-
agement can be required to state a "point range"8 9 that indicates the
minimum and maximum outcomes expected in each projected cate-
gory. Investors provided with this range can assess the riskiness of
management's forecast. Given an expected range of outcomes, the re-
lationship of a particular item to a key variable, such as sales, can be
set forth.90
85. FAF STUDY, sukra note 19, at 36 ("[M]any of the fears and problems [associated
with financial forecasting] have been grossly exaggerated.") Both professional and less
sophisticated investors, "who [behave] to a surprising degree like financial analysts,"
maintain a "healthy skepticism" toward management forecasts. Staff Survey Analyzes Use
of SEC Documents, N.Y.L.J., Dec. 19, 1977, at 36, col. 6. See Securities Act Release No.
5581 (Apr. 28, 1975), [1974-1975] FED. L. REP. (CCH) 80,167, at 85,301 (management's
assessment of firm's future performance is important and should be able to be understood
by investor in light of assumptions made).
86. See Securities Act Release No. 5362 (Feb. 2, 1973), [1972-1973] FED. SEc. L. REP.
(CCH) 79,211, at 82,666 (SEC acknowledged projections are widely used and are not
misleading if "reasonable, based in fact, prepared with care, and adequately reviewed");
cf. Securities Act Release No. 9844 (Nov. 1, 1972), [1972-1973] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH)
79,075 (SEC study on feasibility of formal disclosure of projections).
87. See p. 346 supra. A prediction is an estimate of the economic impact of events
occurring in past accounting periods. Forecasts or projections are estimates of performance
expected in future periods. Commentators have suggested that predictions and projections
are indistinguishable. See Hakansson, Interim Disclosure and Public Forecasts: An
Economic Analysis and a Fiamework for Choice, 52 ACCOUNTING REV. 396, 397 (1977)
(there may be no difference between interim reports that are predictions, and forecasts).
88. See pp. 345, 349 & notes 37, 63-65 supra.
89. The point range, a single figure forecast accompanied by its expected deviation, is
more informative than a simple range that focuses on the end points rather than the
median. Should companies choose a simple range, any variation in actual performance
would create a margin of error double that of a point range. Elgers & May, Problems
with SEC's Forecast Guidelines, CPA J., Mar. 1978, at 21-22. The standard deviation, the
measure of variability used in a point range, should qualify each component estimated.
90. The relationship of an item to a key variable is useful because some projected
figures are subject to either economies or diseconomies of scale. For example, less cash
may be necessary for maintenance expenditures as sales increase. Conversely, the same
sales increase may necessitate increased advertising expenditures. The relationship of each
cash forecast component (maintenance, advertising) to the key variable (sales) will be
valid only for some range of activity. This range should be announced as an assumption.
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Moreover, the assumptions underlying a particular forecast can be
disclosed. In fact, a requirement that relevant assumptions be pre-
sented along with projections has received judicial support.91 An ad-
ditional safeguard can be implemented by requiring management to
supplement a forecast in the event of material deviations from
articulated projections.92 Such a requirement will render financial
forecasts self-correcting. Investors can continually adjust their invest-
ments based on the degree of coincidence between subsequent events
and original assumptions. Disclosures of financial projections, in-
corporating these safeguards, are probably less misleading than in-
formation currently available in the so-called black market.
2. Management Manipulation
Because projections are estimates of the future, it has -been suggested
that an unscrupulous management can defraud investors by manipulat-
ing projections to indicate results favorable to the firm.93 Under a care-
fully planned regulatory mechanism, however, both the SEC and in-
vestors can monitor management practices vigilantly.
Manipulation is discouraged most effectively when the market itself
is able to detect, expose, and censure any unreasonable differences
between projected and actual performance. This can be accomplished
by requiring management to present a variance analysis discussing
91. Beecher v. Able, 374 F. Supp. 341, 348 (S.D.N.Y. 1974). The court held that assump-
tions "bearing on the reasonableness of a forecast" must be disclosed, id., but offered no
standards for the articulation of such assumptions. For a suggested standard of relevance,
see Elgers & Clark, The Role of Assumptions in Financial Forecasts, J. ACCOUNTANCY,
July 1974, at 65 ("Only those assumptions should be disclosed whose violation would
significantly alter the estimate, causing the investor to make a decision different from
one based on the original forecast."); id. ("All-embracing assumptions and those relating
to the general accuracy of the estimates should be avoided."); cf. Securities Act Release
No. 5699 (Apr. 23, 1976), [1975-1976] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 80,461, at 86,201 (projections
must have reasonable basis, must be presented in appropriate format, and must facilitate
investor understanding of their basis and limitations). Commentators have stated that an
assumption is unreasonable if "'chosen in reckless disregard of available contradicting
[sic] information," Carmichael, Financial Forecasts-The Potential Role of Independent
CPAs, J. ACOUNTANCY, Sept. 1974, at 85, and that "[t]he reader should be able to under-
stand the implications of assumptions and so help in forming a judgment as to the
reasonableness of the forecast and to the main uncertainties attached to it." Elgers &
Clark, supra, at 65.
92. Cf. Securities Act Release No. 5092 (Oct. 15, 1970), [1970-1971] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) , 77,915, at 80,035 (obligation to make full and prompt announcements of material
facts notwithstanding all other reporting requirements); Dayan, Correcting Errors in the
Press, 5 REv. SEC. REa. 941 (1972).
93. See Heller, suPra note 41, at 306-07 (companies might present over-optimistic views
of expected results). Many believe that earnings forecasts, asset appraisals, or any other
information based on opinions or estimates are inherently manipulative. See In re Thomas
Bond, Inc., 5 S.E.C. 60, 71 (1939) (forecasts give false appearance of precision that renders
them inherently misleading).
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material variations between projected and actual results. In fact, be-
cause detailed forecasts of cash flows can be compared to actual cash
flow information unaffected by accounting methods, they are poten-
tially less vulnerable to manipulation than single-figure earnings fore-
casts. Forecasts should therefore provide the investor with detailed
information concerning significant components0 4 of the firm's recurring
and nonrecurring cash flows.95 Moreover, required articulation of
underlying assumptions eliminates many avenues of potential am-
biguity that might otherwise be subject to intentional manipulation. 0
The SEC can also foster the disclosure of good faith projections by
requiring review of management data by an independent auditor be-
fore its dissemination to the public. 9 7 Furthermore, courts are likely
to hold managements liable for misleading investors unless forecasts
are reasonable and based on facts.98
B. Fear of Excessive Costs
Even if projections provide essential information to investors, man-
agements have traditionally argued that mandatory disclosure would
impose excessive costs. The pecuniary costs of disclosure, however, are
94. The SEC currently uses the term "significant" to designate components, such as
materials, advertising, and research and development, that should be independently
presented in financial statements. A component should be considered *'significant" when
it has either a 10% impact on sales or a 2% impact on income. See Securities Act Release
No. 5488, 17 C.F.R. § 210.1-02(u) (1977), reprinted in 5 FED. Si:c. L. REP. (CCH) C 72,177
(using 10% rule for reporting "significant" subsidiaries).
95. Recurring and nonrecurring cash flows should be clearly segregated. The former
should include results of operations and related projected dividends. The latter should
include sales and purchases of capital assets, acquisitions and divestitures, refunding of
debt or new offerings, and share repurchases or new equity issues.
96. See p. 355 supra.
97. See Carmichael, supra note 91, at 85 (investors and regulators will expect CPAs to
provide safeguard against unscrupulous and inept preparers); Corless & Norgaard, User
Reactions to CPA Reports on Forecasts, J. AcCOUNTANCY, Aug. 1974, at 54 (CPA's report
would increase user confidence in forecasted data, particularly when user is unsophis-
ticated). But see COHEN COMMISsION, supra note 43, at 69 (financial forecasts should be
audited only after process of preparing forecasts is standardized); cf. ADVISORY COMMITTEE
REPORT, supra note 9, at D-36 (concluding that "third party review of management projec.
tions should be permitted but not required").
Moreover, the Commission on Auditor's Responsibilities has suggested that the audit
function be extended to include "understanding of the process used by the company to
prepare significant financial information released regularly during the year," and to
"review the company's financial reporting process for preparing quarterly information
released to the public." COHEN COMMISSION, supra note 43, at 61-63. Should these pro-
cedures be adopted, a forecast review, based on a previously audited system of internal
controls, would be highly simplified.
98. See Beecher v. Able, 374 F. Supp. 341, 348 (S.D.N.Y. 1974). Liability under section
11 of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1976), and section 10(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, id. § 78j(b), will be found against executives aqd experts guilty of
manipulation of financial forecasts in bad faith, either by smoothing information or by
fraudulently representing opinions without a reasonable basis for the belief stated.
Future-Oriented Disclosure
probably not significant 9 because all public companies are now re-
quired to maintain systems of internal control'0o and because most
businesses regularly generate projections for internal use. 10
Although public disclosure of these projections will not significantly
increase the costs of accumulating and disseminating information,
managements have also claimed that disclosure will lead to competitive
injury to the firm, distortion of management decisions, and excessive
legal liability. Because these costs can be minimized by a carefully
drafted disclosure plan, the potential harm to the firm is outweighed
by the advantages of disclosure to the investor.
1. Competitive Injury
Managements appear to be most concerned that disclosure of finan-
cial projections will weaken the firm's competitive position. 0 2 Studies
have concluded, however, that there is no "significant competitive
cost associated with current reporting requirements."' 03 Since man-
99. See FAF STUDY, supra note 19, at 39 ("[M]ore systematic disclosure of management
forecasts should not impose any significant additional costs. The information is already
available. ... ); ef. ADVISORY CO.%iMITrEE REPORT, supra note 9, at 26-27 (costs of pre-
paring currently required Form 8-k range from S289 for firms with assets in excess of $1
billion to $686 for firms with less than $100 million in assets); Ronen, A Test of the
Feasibility of Preparing Discounted Cash Flow Accounting Statements, in 2 OBJECTIVES
OF FINANCIAL STATEMENTS, supra note 11, at 211 (preparing financial statements and
financial forecasts based on discounted cash flow accounting for firms with assets of
$8,565,000 involves approximately 40 hours).
100. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-213, § 102, 91 Stat. 1494
(1977) (to be codified in 15 U.S.C. § 78q(b)) (requiring that every issuer subject to periodic
filing requirements "devise and maintain a system of internal accounting controls sufficient
to provide reasonable assurances that . . . transactions are recorded ... as necessary to
permit preparation of financial statements").
101. Kripke, supra note 34, at 1197-98 ("[M]ost sizeable corporations use projections of
future sales and revenues and capital needs as the basis for making very important
decisions as to borrowing, building new plants, establishing new branches, ordering
materials, hiring and training labor, etc. . . . [and are] in a better position than the
public to forecast where the company is going....); Mann, Prospectuses: Unreadable or
Just Unread?-A Proposal to Reexamine Policies Against Permitting Projections, 40 GEo.
WASH. L. REV. 222, 230 (1971) ("[C]orporatc management is constantly planning future
expansion and making financial commitments on the basis of [available] internal projec-
tions.")
102. The foremost unstated objection to disclosure of projections stems from man-
agement's "natural desire to profit from hard-earned inside information." Libby &
Rollinson, supra note 26, at 704. "[T]ipping one's hand to the competition" is a tradi-
tional argument against disclosure generally. Id. at 704. This argument has been ad.
dressed by Congress on many occasions. Cf. H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 13
(1934), reprinted in 5 J. ELLENBERGER & E. MAHAR, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE SECURITIES
Acr OF 1933 AND SECURITmS EXCHANGE ACr OF 1934 (1973) ("[T]he idea that a fair report
of corporate assets and profits give [sic] unfair advantage to competitors is no longer
seriously entertained by any modern businessman.") [hereinafter cited as H.R. REP. No.
1383]. But see H. MANNE, INSIDER TRADING AND THE STocK MARKET (1966) (insiders should
not only be permitted to retain proprietary information but should also be permitted to
trade on such information as incentive).
103. ADVIsORY COMIarrEE REPORT, supra note 9, at 22-23.
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agements are already disclosing forecasts to selected analysts, 0 4 formal
dissemination to the public is unlikely to injure the company. More-
over, sensitive plans for future financing and investment are already
governed by existing disclosure rules relating to new offerings, 0 5
tender offers' 0 6 and mergers. 07 These disclosures have not had a det-
rimental effect. Indeed, the suppression of material adverse informa-
tion that would injure a firm's competitive position has been illegal
for some time. 108
Under a carefully conceived disclosure plan, management would not
be required to reveal inchoate plans or delicate negotiations until ar-
rangements are concrete. 0 9 Revelation of such information is not
necessary to the realization of the purpose of a disclosure requirement:
providing an indication to investors of the direction and magnitude of
management plans.
2. Distortion of Management Decisions
It has been suggested that if management is forced to disclose its
goals, the threat of liability or embarrassment will foster a blind
pursuit of stated prognostications rather than a flexible response to
unforeseen events. Management should feel no such pressure, how-
ever, if a revised approach is the result of exogenous factors. More-
over, management can explain its actions by isolating the impact of
events beyond its control or by pointing to previously disclosed assump-
tions that were not borne out by subsequent events.
A detailed projection that includes a variance analysis thus provides
an invaluable device for evaluating management performance. An
investor can assess management's ability to present rational expecta-
tions, to realize stated goals, and to respond appropriately to events
beyond its control. Investors are concerned with management's plan-
ning ability as well as with the fulfillment of specific projections. 10
Hence, managements are rewarded for formulating reasonable plans
104. See pp. 351-52 & notes 74-81 supra.
105. 15 U.S.C. § 77aa (1976).
106. Id. § 78n(d).
107. Id. § 78n(a) (governing proxy solicitations required by most state statutes for
consummation of merger).
108. See Securities Act Release No. 5092 (Oct. 15, 1970), [1970-1971] FED. SEc. L. REP.
(CCH) 77,915, at 80,035 (obligation to make full and prompt announcements of material
facts notwithstanding all other reporting requirements).
109. See Brudney, A Note on Chilling Tender Solicitations, 21 RUTGERS L. Rav. 609,
621 (1967) (disclosure obligations should be curtailed when disclosure might prevent con-
summation of advantageous transaction and when information is highly indefinite).
110. See ADVISORY ComrarrE REPORT, supra note 9, at 50-51" (analysis addresses not
only management's response to economic events but also changes in responsiveness of
company to economic events).
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and solving problems creatively."' There is no special reward for the
management that can fulfill prophecies with precision." 2
3. Risk of Legal Liability
Managements have also feared mandatory disclosure of forecasts be-
cause of the threat of legal liability should stated projections not be
realized."13 It is well established, however, that projections made in
good faith cannot result in liability under federal securities law."
4
Indeed, because projections are crucial factors in the investment deci-
sion, they might be considered material information that must be
disclosed.7 5 Contrary to management fears, courts have not held man-
111. See Mann, supra note 101, at 230.
112. Cf. Carmichael, supra note 91, at 84 (accuracy is not objective of publishing
forecasts). But see Ruland, The Accuracy of Forecasts by Management and by Financial
Analysts, 53 ACCOUNTING REV. 439, 446 (1978) (accuracy of analyst's forecasts increased by
availability of management forecasts).
113. See Herwitz, The Risk of Liability for Forecasting, in 2 OBJECTIVES OF FINANCIAL
STATEMENTS, supra note 11, at 250 (fear that "crushing burden of liability, out of all pro-
portion to the magnitude of the defendant's fault" would result); cf. id. at 247 (dis-
tinguishing between risk of being sued and risk of liability, since forecasts that go awry
"will present a very inviting target to potential shareholder litigants").
114. See, e.g., Securities Exchange Act Release No. 9984 (Feb. 2, 1973), [1972-1973]
FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) c 79,211, at 82,666; A. BROMBERG, SECURITIES LAW § 5.3 (1974); A.
JACOBs, THE IMPACT OF RULE 10B-5, at 3-56 (1977).
Managements fear that suits will be based on section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933,
15 U.S.C. § 77k (1976), and section 10b of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C.
§ 78j(b) (1976). Under § 77k, however, the issuer is protected from frivolous suits through
exercise of the court's discretion: "[I]f the court believes the suit . . . to [be] without
merit," the plaintiff may be directed to post a bond for the costs that may be assessed
against him in the event an adverse judgment is rendered. Id. § 77k(e). See Straus v.
Holiday Inns, Inc., No. 77-383 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 6, 1978) (bond must be posted when claim
is "so utterly lacking in merit as to border on the frivolous"). There are a number of
restrictions applicable to suits brought under § 78j(b). See, e.g., Ernst & Ernst v. Hoch-
felder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976) (management must have scienter in order to be held liable);
Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975) (private right of action
confined to purchasers and sellers of securities). Thus the securities laws shield manage-
ments from claims that are obviously without merit.
115. See Schneider, Financial Projections-Practical Problems of Disclosure, in PLI
FIFT ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON SECURITIES REGULATION 47, 50-54 (1974) (issuer's choice to
project or not to project may turn out to be illusory because of duty to disclose material
information); Libby & Rollinson, supra note 26, at 703 (management projections clearly
material information). The Supreme Court has defined materiality as those facts that a
"reasonable investor might have considered .. . important in the making of [his] decision."
Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 153-54 (1972). The SEC has found
materiality when a fact "was of such importance that it could be expected to affect the
judgment of investors ... [or] to affect materially the market price of the stock." Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 43 S.E.C. 933, 937 (1968). Financial forecasts would
seem to fall under these definitions of material information because they contain man-
agement data that investors consider highly pertinent. FAF STUDY, supra note 19, at 70
(materiality of forecasts to investors seems to be assumed both administratively and
judicially). A projection or forecast is a fact. See ALI FED. SEC. CODE § 234A (Reporter's
Revision of Tent. Drafts Nos. 1-3, 1974). A projection will usually be a material fact
within almost "any definition of materiality," Ruder, supra note 83, at 35-36, and "will
359
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agements liable solely for inaccurate forecasts of future performance.' 1 6
At least one court has concluded that projections that represent a
fair and accurate reflection of best estimates available to management
do not impose liability on the issuer.1 17 The SEC should adopt a
similar position. 118 In any event, management should not be required
to disclose information that violates the fiduciary duty owed to share-
holders. 19
IV. Proposed Guidelines for Financial Forecasts
The future-oriented information required by investors cannot be
obtained from currently available disclosures, 120 and selective dis-
closure of forecast data is both inequitable and inefficient.' 2 Since a
carefully conceived disclosure policy will not present significant dis-
advantages, managements should be required to disclose formal finan-
certainly be material if it deviates from well known public estimates." Id. at 18. See Libby
& Rollinson, supra note 26, at 701 ("[p]crmitting projections to be included in prospectuses
and other filings with the [SEC] will, because of the materiality of such projections,
eventually result in a court-imposed mandate to include said projections in SEC filings if
management has and uses the projections for any purpose.")
It is, therefore, doubtful whether a firm can offer its shares for sale without disclosing
adverse material forecasts. See FAF STUDY, supra note 19, at 26 ("Management forecast
information is of such importance to imestors that it would seem to fall in the class of
information subject to insider trading rules.") Similarly, companies that buy their own
securities may be precluded from doing so if the firm's nonpublic internal forecast is
highly favorable. See Ruder, supra note 83, at 1 ("If the corporation's projections are
materially different from the projections that are in common use by outsiders, I would
regard company activity in purchasing stock based upon those projections as being in
violation of Rule lOb-5.")
116. See Marx v. Computer Sciences Corp., 507 F.2d 485 (9th Cir. 1974) (issuer will not
be held accountable unless reckless or grossly negligent in preparation of projection);
Milberg v. Western Pac. R.R., 51 F.R.D. 280, 282 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), dismissed, 443 F.2d
1301 (2d Cir. 1971) (investor cannot reasonably expect projections to be infallible). The
claim that regulated forecasts will invite lawsuits is unpersuasive. See FAF STUDY, supra
note 19, at 68 ("The result of this profusion of unregulated forecasts . .. has not been a
spate of lawsuits over the adequacy of the forecasts.")
117. Dolgow v. Anderson, 53 F.R.D. 664, 670 (E.D.N.Y. 1971), aff'd, 464 F.2d 437 (2d
Cir. 1972); cf. Beecher v. Able, 374 F. Supp. 341 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (projections unreasonable
because key assumptions not disclosed, i.e., forecast did not convey management consensus
of best estimate).
118. Similar "safe harbour" rules have been provided for preparers of supplementary
replacement cost data. See Securities Act Release No. 5695, 17 C.F.R. § 210.3-17(g) (1977),
reprinted in 5 FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 72,212, at 62,508 (no liability for current replace-
ment cost information unless prepared without reasonable basis or disclosed other than in
good faith).
119. See V. BRUDNEY & M. CHIRELSTEIN, supra note 16, at 717 (conflicting tensions
between investor's need for disclosure of relevant information and harm that may come
from such disclosure). For example, merger or contract negotiations in progress, if dis-
closed, could defeat the firm's competitive advantage-and thus the shareholder's interests.
120. See pp. 343-53 supra.
121. See pp. 351-53 supra.
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cial forecasts. Indeed, it is arguable that the SEC has a statutory duty
to ensure access to such information.122
Financial forecasts should be mandatory123 for most public com-
panies in order to facilitate comparison among a broad range of in-
vestment opportunities12 4 and to mitigate the structural inefficiency
of the present selective disclosure system.' 25 Forecasts should provide
detailed information concerning cash flows,' 20 including point ranges
and key variables. 127 The forecast should also disclose relevant assump-
tions that underlie projections 28 and include a variance analysis of
projected and actual results.1
29
Moreover, formal forecasts should include safeguards that ensure
that projections are both reliable and self-correcting. The tentative
nature of the information presented should therefore be indicated
by clearly segregating forecasts from historic reports. 30 In addition,
forecasts should be carefully reviewed by independent accountants.' 31
122. The statutory duty to report to investors, imposed on managements by the
securities laws, formalized management's common law duty of stewardship, or responsi-
bility for the safekeeping of assets entrusted to its custody. See FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING
STANDARDS BOARD, TENTATIVE CONCLUSIONS ON OBJECTIVES OF FINANCIAL STATEMENTS OF
BUsINESS ENTERPRISES 58-59 (1976) (accounting and reporting developed from steward's duty
to medieval lord of manor and demonstrated that administrators had honestly and
properly cared for monies and other property for which they were responsible). In
recommending passage of the Securities Act of 1933, President Roosevelt alluded to "the
ancient truth" that "those who manage . . . corporations [i.e., those who use] other
people's money are trustees acting for others" and that "no essentially important element
attending [an] issue [should] be concealed from the buying public." 77 CONG. Rac. 937
(1933). Under evolving standards of accountability, management's duty now extends to a
duty to increase as well as to preserve wealth. See AICPA STUDY GROUP, supra note 18,
at 26 ("An objective of financial statements is to supply information useful in judging
management's ability to utilize enterprise resources effectively in achieving the primary
enterprise goal."); Rosenfield, Stewardship, in 2 OBJECTIVE OF FINANCIAL STATEMENTS,
supra note 11, at 123-40 (relating stewardship and accountability to economic decisions of
investors that concern future). Since wealth is defined, under modern financial theory, as
the present interest in future returns, see note 21 supra, management's duty to report
extends to that information. Thus, management's plans for the owner's wealth, namely
financial projections, are subject to disclosure requirements just as is information con-
cerning historic performance. In fact, Congress recognized that prior to enactment of the
securities laws managements maintained their control of the shareholders' interests with-
out an "'adequate explanation of the management policies they intend[ed] to pursue."
H.R. REP. No. 1383, supra note 102, at 13-14.
123. In order to make financial forecasts mandatory, the SEC would have to amend
Regulation S-X, 17 C.F.R. § 210 (1977). The requirement need not be applicable to all
firms immediately. To effectuate the goals set forth in this Note, it need initially apply
only to firms with assets in excess of $100,000,000.
124. See p. 342 supra.
125. See pp. 351-53 supra.
126. See p. 356 supra.
127. See p. 354 supra.
128. See p. 355 supra.
129. See pp. 355-56 supra.
130. See p. 354 supra.
131. See p. 356 supra.
The Yale Law Journal
Finally, the SEC should require immediate correction whenever newly
available information indicates material deviation from a prior fore-
cast.'32
As a guide to courts on questions of liability, the SEC should adopt
a policy position that both permits management to be flexible in its
future behavior and protects investors from management manipula-
tion.133 Such an administrative policy would limit liability to situa-
tions in which forecast information: was prepared without a reason-
able basis for belief; was disclosed in bad faith; or was not carefully
reviewed by management and by independent accountants. 13 4 More-
over, managements should not be required to project the consequences
of delicate negotiations or highly uncertain events.'It
A regulation conforming to the guidelines suggested in this Note
will ensure that the investor is provided with reliable future-oriented
information and thus reduce the unfairness inherent in current dis-
closure requirements. The availability of such information will en-
hance the efficiency of securities markets and more equitably allocate
capital resources. Such a regulation, therefore, furthers the twin goals
of federal securities regulation. 36
132. See p. 355 supra.
133. See pp. 358-59 supra.
134. See p. 360 supra.
135. See p. 358 supra.
136. See p. 338 & note 3 sukra.
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